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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 17-2168 
______________ 
 
PATRICK J. DOHENY, JR., 
an adult individual, 
    Appellant 
                    
v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,  
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,  
BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, a government agency;  
JANET L. DOLAN, an adult individual; KARA N. TEMPLETON,  
an adult individual; WILLIAM A. KUHAR, JR., an adult individual;  
TERRENCE EDWARDS, an adult individual;  
DONALD J. SMITH, an adult individual;  
WILLIAM J. CRESSLER, an adult individual;  
PHILIP MURRAY BRICKNELL, an adult individual  
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-16-cv-01744) 
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 23, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Filed:  July 23, 2019) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
Plaintiff Patrick J. Doheny, Jr. appeals the District Court’s orders granting 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss and granting in part and denying in part his motion for 
reconsideration.  Because the Court soundly exercised its discretion in remanding Count I 
and correctly dismissed Counts II through IV of Doheny’s complaint, we will affirm.  
I 
A 
Doheny was involved in a car accident, resulting in his criminal conviction and 
sentence for violating two provisions of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.  Following his 
sentence, the Department of Transportation Bureau of Driver Licensing (“PennDOT”) 
sent him two “Official Notice of Suspension” letters, each with a mail date of July 3, 
2013, informing him of a one-year suspension of his driver’s license.  App. 109-14.  The 
letters, signed by then-PennDOT Director Janette Dolan, directed Doheny to surrender 
his license by August 7, 2013.  In addition, the first letter stated that his suspension 
period, based on a violation of 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3735.1, would begin on 
August 7, 2013, and the second letter said that his suspension period, based on a violation 
of 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3802(b), would begin on August 7, 2014.  The 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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letters also advised Doheny of his right to appeal within thirty days of the July 3, 2013 
mail date.  On August 20, 2013, Doheny received another letter from PennDOT, 
confirming that he would not be eligible for reinstatement of his operating privileges until 
August 2015 and describing the reinstatement process.   
In September 2013, Plaintiff filed a “petition to file appeal nunc pro tunc” in the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, asserting that the suspension notices were 
deceptive and prevented his timely appeal.  App. 33 (capitalization omitted).  The court 
granted Doheny’s petition to file an untimely appeal, but ultimately dismissed his appeal 
challenging the suspension notice on the merits.  Doheny appealed to the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court, which held that pursuant to 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1550 and 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5571, the Court of Common Pleas erred in 
granting Doheny’s petition to file an untimely appeal.  Doheny v. Commonwealth, Dep’t 
of Transp., No. 2019 C.D.2014, 2015 WL 9393952 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015), 
amended 2016 WL 1002079 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 17, 2016), pet. for allowance of 
appeal denied 141 A.3d 436 (Pa. 2016) (Mem.) (per curiam). 
B 
 Doheny sued PennDOT, Dolan, current PennDOT director Kara Templeton, and 
various PennDOT attorneys1 in state court.  Defendants removed the case to federal 
court.  Doheny filed an amended complaint: (1) seeking declaratory judgments that the 
                                              
1 These attorneys are PennDOT’s Chief Counsel William Cressler, Deputy Chief 
Counsel Donald Smith, and Assistant Counsel Terrence Edwards, Philip Bricknell, and 
William Kuhar.   
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two-year suspension is void (Count I) and that 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1550 
and 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5571 are unconstitutional (Count II); and (2) 
requesting prospective injunctive relief (Count III) and damages (Count IV) under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.2 
Defendants moved to dismiss Doheny’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The District Court granted the motion, holding that (1) the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar consideration of Doheny’s claims, Doheny v. Pa. 
Dep’t of Transp., Civ. A. No. 16-1744, 2017 WL 1282716, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 
2017); (2) Defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because Doheny 
“seeks in Count I a declaration that the Defendant state agency and state official violated 
state law,” id. (emphasis omitted); (3) the thirty-day appeal deadline for a license 
suspension is constitutional, id. at *5-6; (4) PennDOT is not a person subject to suit under 
§ 1983, id. at *6; (5) PennDOT’s attorneys are absolutely immune, id.; and (6) Doheny 
failed to state a procedural due process claim against Templeton and Dolan because he 
did not timely invoke the appellate process, and the time period for filing appeals does 
not violate his due process rights, id. *7.  
Doheny moved for reconsideration, which the District Court granted with respect 
to Count I, remanding that Count to the state court.  The Court explained that, even if 
Defendants had waived Eleventh Amendment immunity, it would decline to exercise 
                                              
2 Doheny also brought Equal Protection Clause and § 1985(3) claims, which the 
District Court dismissed.  Doheny v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Civ. A. No. 16-1744, 2017 
WL 1282716, at *7-8 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2017).  He does not challenge these rulings.   
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supplemental jurisdiction over Count I because it is “grounded entirely in state law and 
the Court has dismissed with prejudice all federal claims.”3  Doheny v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Transp., Civ. A. No. 16-1744, 2017 WL 1493857, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2017).  The 
Court did not reconsider its other rulings.  Id.   
Plaintiff appeals these orders. 
II4 
A 
Doheny is not entitled to a declaratory judgment that his second suspension notice 
is void ab initio based on state law.  This is a state law claim over which a district court 
                                              
3 Following the District Court’s remand, the Commonwealth Court dismissed 
Count I, holding that res judicata and administrative finality barred Doheny’s collateral 
attack on the order denying his nunc pro tunc appeal and suspension.  Doheny v. 
Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 171 A.3d 930, 935-36 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017).  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.  Doheny v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 
187 A.3d 246 (Pa. 2018) (Mem.) (per curiam).  
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo the Court’s order 
dismissing Doheny’s complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  Fowler 
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  
We disregard “a pleading’s legal conclusions” but “assume all remaining factual 
allegations to be true” and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016).  In addition to the 
factual allegations in the complaint, we may consider “undisputedly authentic documents 
if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.”  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 
F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).   
An appeal of an order denying a motion for reconsideration “brings up the 
underlying judgment for review.”  Quality Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 
675 F.2d 77, 78 (3d Cir. 1982).  “[W]hen a district court predicates its denial of 
reconsideration on an issue of law, our review is plenary, and when it bases its denial on 
an issue of fact, we review for clear error.”  Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 
2013).  
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may exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  Here, the District Court 
acted within its discretion in declining to do so since it “dismissed all claims over which 
it ha[d] original jurisdiction.”5  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 
Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We review a district court’s refusal to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.”).   
Moreover, even if Count I were not dismissed under § 1367, dismissal would be 
warranted because Doheny fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.  Doheny 
received two one-year suspensions, one pursuant to 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1532(a), and the other pursuant to 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3804(e)(2)(i).  
Doheny’s argument that the two should have merged into a single one-year suspension is 
meritless.  Under Pennsylvania law, the suspension of Doheny’s license and driving 
privileges was a collateral consequence of his criminal convictions, and thus are not 
subject to the criminal doctrine of merger.  Bell v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 96 
A.3d 1005, 1019 (Pa. 2014).6  In addition, the language of § 1532(a) shows that 
                                              
5 We need not resolve whether PennDOT and Templeton waived their Eleventh 
Amendment immunity by removing Doheny’s state complaint to federal court.  
Defendants did not affirmatively argue Eleventh Amendment immunity on appeal, but 
rather have adopted the argument that “even if” they were not immune, these Defendants 
are not “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983.  Appellees’ Br. at 35.  
6 Applying Bell does not violate the ex post facto clause.  See Peugh v. United 
States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) and 
describing four ex post facto categories); Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1195 
(Pa. 2017) (same).  First, the ex post facto clause applies to criminal laws, and as Doheny 
acknowledges, the suspensions are civil collateral consequences of a criminal proceeding.  
See Thorek v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 938 A.2d 505, 509 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2007) (“The licensing of vehicle operators is civil in nature and is separate and apart from 
criminal DUI proceedings.” (citation omitted)).  Second, the ex post facto clause applies 
to legislative enactments, and Bell is a judicial opinion that interpreted statutes that 
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suspensions are not intended to merge.7  Id.  Therefore, because the consecutive 
suspensions are lawful, Doheny is not entitled to declaratory relief stating that his second 
suspension notice was invalid under state law.  For this additional reason, the District 
Court properly dismissed Count I of the complaint.   
B 
In Count II, Doheny asserts that, facially or as applied, 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 1550(a) and 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5571(b) unconstitutionally 
deprive individuals like him of a right to seek relief from illegal action by PennDOT.  
This claim fails.   
The statutes do not unconstitutionally restrict a petitioner’s ability to challenge 
license suspensions.  The Vehicle Code affords a person “whose operating privilege has 
been recalled, suspended, revoked or disqualified by [PennDOT] . . . the right to appeal,” 
75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1550(a), if the appeal is “commenced within 30 days 
after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken,” 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. 
                                              
existed at the time of Doheny’s offenses.  Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 667 
(Pa. 2015) (“The ex post facto prohibition is concerned with legislative acts, as opposed 
to judicial decisions.” (citing Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001)).   
7 Doheny’s argument that merger applies because the 2003 General Assembly 
amendments made suspensions criminal under 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3804 is 
meritless.  Section 3804 “Penalties” appears within a portion of the Vehicle Code entitled 
“Operation of Vehicles,” in the chapter “Driving After Imbibing Alcohol or Utilizing 
Drugs.”  PennDOT may issue a suspension “upon receiving a certified record of the 
individual’s conviction or an adjudication of delinquency for” an offense under § 3802 
(“Driving Under Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance”).  75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 3804(e).  Therefore, the section indicates that suspensions are collateral, non-
criminal consequences flowing from a DUI conviction.  Bell, 96 A.3d at 1007 (involving 
a § 3804(e)(2)(i) suspension). 
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Ann. § 5571(b).  Thus, the statute provides an adequate period to seek judicial review of 
a driver’s license suspension, and it is facially constitutional.8 
Doheny’s “as applied” challenge, App. 86, also fails because it is actually an effort 
to have a federal court review the state court order denying his untimely appeal.  When a 
plaintiff sues in federal court after filing suit in state court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
prohibits a district court from exercising jurisdiction.  See ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int’l, 366 
F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2004).  For the doctrine to apply, four requirements must be met: 
“(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries 
caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the 
federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and 
reject the state judgments.”  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 
F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).   
Here, all four elements are satisfied.  First, Doheny lost in his state court 
proceedings where the Commonwealth Court declined to permit an untimely appeal of 
his suspensions.  Second, Doheny’s “as applied” challenge, App. 86, attacks the state 
                                              
8 The “statutory time limit[] for taking an appeal [is] jurisdictional.”  Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210 (2007); Fetherman v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 167 
A.3d 846, 849 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (“If an appeal [of a license suspension] is not filed 
within 30 days as statutorily mandated, the court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal of 
the suspension unless the delay in filing the appeal was caused by fraud or a breakdown 
in the administrative process.”).  Therefore, the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas 
lacked jurisdiction over the late-filed appeal.  Fetherman, 167 A.3d at 850; Doheny, 2016 
WL 1002079, at *3-4; see also Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213 (“[W]hen an appeal has not been 
prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of [the legislature], 
it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).  
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courts for treating PennDOT as a “preferred litigant in statutory appeals” and for failing 
to credit his argument that his delay in appealing is irrelevant since PennDOT, according 
to Doheny, never had the jurisdiction to impose consecutive license suspensions in the 
first place, Appellant’s Br. at 35.  Therefore, he is complaining of an injury caused by the 
state court, not by PennDOT’s actions or the relevant statutes governing his appellate 
rights.  Third, the Commonwealth Court decision predates this action.  Fourth, the relief 
he seeks would “effectively would reverse a state court decision or void its ruling.”  
Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation 
omitted).  Therefore, Rooker-Feldman bars a federal court from granting Doheny relief. 
For these reasons, the District Court properly dismissed Count II.  
C 
Doheny’s § 1983 claim in Count III against PennDOT and Templeton also fails 
because, assuming they waived Eleventh Amendment immunity,9 they may not be sued 
under § 1983.  Under § 1983, only “persons” are amenable to suit.  Will v. Mich. Dep’t 
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (“Section 1983 . . . does not provide a federal 
forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil 
                                              
9 Because a plaintiff may sue state officials for prospective injunctive relief to end 
ongoing violations of federal law, Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013), and Doheny seeks only 
injunctive relief in Count III, Templeton would not be immune from suit.  For the same 
reasons described with respect to Doheny’s due process claims against Dolan in Count 
IV, however, Doheny has not stated violations of federal law and thus is not entitled to 
injunctive relief.  See infra Section III.D. 
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liberties.”).  The Commonwealth’s agency PennDOT10 and Templeton in her official 
capacity are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.  See id. at 71 (“[N]either a state 
nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”); Patterson 
v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 915 F.3d 945, 956 n.2 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] state, including an 
entity that is an arm of the state, is not a ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore 
cannot be sued for damages under that statute.”).   Therefore, the District Court properly 
dismissed Doheny’s § 1983 claim in Count III. 
D 
The District Court also properly dismissed Doheny’s due process claim in Count 
IV against the PennDOT attorneys and Dolan in their individual capacities.   
The PennDOT attorneys are immune from Doheny’s claims.  The PennDOT 
attorneys functioned as advocates for the state agency by litigating Doheny’s appeals on 
PennDOT’s behalf.11  “[A]gency officials performing certain functions analogous to 
those of a prosecutor should be able to claim absolute immunity with respect to such 
acts.”  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978); Light v. Haws, 472 F.3d 74, 78-80 
(3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing absolute immunity applies to a defendant who functioned as 
an agency advocate in bringing a civil compliance action and civil contempt petitions).  
                                              
10 Other courts have similarly held that state departments of transportation are 
arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.  See, e.g., U.S. Oil Recovery Site 
Potentially Responsible Parties Grp. v. Railroad Comm’n of Tex., 898 F.3d 497, 501 (5th 
Cir. 2018) (holding Texas Department of Transportation is an arm of the state); Robinson 
v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 966 F.2d 637, 640 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding Georgia Department 
of Transportation is an arm of the state). 
11 The alleged conduct here is not an administrative or investigative function that 
precludes absolute immunity.  See Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 211-13 (3d Cir. 2008).  
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Because the PennDOT attorneys were performing prosecutorial functions, they “are 
immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
430 (1976), and the claim against them lodged in Count IV was properly dismissed.  
Doheny’s due process claim against Dolan also fails.  While the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation of a driver’s license, a post-
deprivation hearing and appeal process satisfy due process.  Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 
105, 112, 115 (1977); see Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp. v. McCafferty, 758 A.2d 
1155, 1163 (Pa. 2000).  To comport with due process, the government need only provide 
“notice reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties” of property deprivations.  
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (citation omitted).  Here, Doheny received 
two notices of suspension clearly informing him that his license would be suspended for 
one year beginning August 7, 2013 and another year beginning August 7, 2014.  In 
addition, the letters advised him of his “right to appeal this action to the Court of 
Common Pleas (Civil Division) within 30 days of the mail date, JULY 03, 2013, of this 
letter.”  App. 111, 113.  Thus, PennDOT notified him of a thirty-day window to appeal 
the suspensions before they became effective.  “This de novo appeal before a court of 
law is an appropriate and adequate remedy that can be used to raise any defense, whether 
constitutional or statutory.”  Smires v. O’Shell, 126 A.3d 383, 390 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2015) (discussing 75 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1550(a)).  Furthermore, Doheny cannot claim a 
constitutional injury arising from a purported due process violation because he never 
timely invoked the appeal process available to him.  See Elsmere Park Club, LP v. Town 
of Elsmere, 542 F.3d 412, 423 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]o state a claim for failure to provide 
  
12 
 
due process, a plaintiff must have taken advantage of the processes that are available to 
him or her . . . . Thus, the [plaintiff’s] failure to take advantage of that process means it 
cannot claim a constitutional injury.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  
For these reasons, Doheny fails to state a due process claim against Dolan. 
Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed Count IV. 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.12 
                                              
12 Leave to amend would be futile.  Many of the parties Doheny attempts to sue 
are either immune from or not amenable to suit, and he fails to state claims for relief 
based on constitutional violations.  Doheny’s assertion that “the Commonwealth Court 
created additional due process violations for which amendment of the complaint is not 
only appropriate, but necessary, to address,” Appellant’s Br. at 47, also does not support 
amendment.  Not only did he fail to provide a proposed amended complaint to the 
District Court, but Doheny’s vague comment does not show that he could state claim for 
relief.   
We also decline to grant Doheny’s motion to certify the issues in Count I to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has already supplied the 
precedent we need to resolve the issues presented.  See Pa. R. App. P. 3341(c).   
